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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

JANE LARAWAY MILLER
Plaintiff & Respondent,

Case No.

-vs.-

8862

ORRIN TOWLER MILLER,
Defendant & Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The sole question before this court is whether the
defendant, Orrin T. Miller, the natural father of Jane
Ann Miller, may effectively withdraw his consent to adop.tion, which he had previously given.
At the outset, it should be mentioned that defendant
was not represented by counsel in the lower court; conse.quently there is some confusion in the record. Defendant's
motion to set aside the consent (R. 18) was improperly
numbered and filed in the case of Miller vs. Miller (No.
1
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106986), which was the divorce case between the parents
of the child in question. Likewise was the order denying
defendant's motion improperly filed (R. 20). For this rea-son it has been necessary to designate portions of both
records; however, it should be kept in mind that this appeal
is concerned with the adoption case, and the order which
should have been filed therein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts upon which this appeal is based can best
be explained in their chronological sequence.
Plaintiff, Jane Larraway Miller, and defendant, Orrin
Towler Miller, were legally divorced from each other on
January 4, 1957. Plaintiff was awarded the care and custo-dy of their one child, Jane Ann Miller, who is the subject
of the adoption in the case presently before the court.
In the decree of divorce, the court in making a property
settlement awarded plaintiff all the property she owned
prior to the marriage, including corporate stocks, life in-surance, and wedding gifts; cash in the lump sum of
$2,808.00 which was to come from government bonds
which the court ordered to be sold; $75.00 per month
alimony; $60.00 per month child support; and $300 attor-ney's fees (R. 1--3). The remainder of the proceeds from
the sale of the government bonds, plus some other funds
totalling approximately $5,067.00 was then awarded to
defendant; however, after reciting that this property was
to be awarded defendant, the court impressed the funds
with a lien to secure the payment of alimony and support,
and defendant was restrained from ever withdrawing or
using said funds (R. }..3). Thus, defendant in effect lost
everything.
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22 days after the divorce became final, plaintiff re~
married Samuel Clyde Kemp, who was later to become
the petitioner for adoption in the instant case (R. 9 & 29).
At that time defendant petitioned the court for a modifi~
cation of the decree (R. 7). When the matter came on for
hearing, defendant made a motion for a continuance which
was deined by the court (R. 12). The case was heard and
the decree was modified to eliminate further payments of
alimony; however, with respect to the removal of the lien
no change was made (R. 12 & 13).
Subsequently, on January 17, 1958 defendant again
petitioned the court for modification, asking that the lien
be removed on his funds (R. 14). Defendant's petition al~
leged that he was a graduate engineer and well able to
provide the monthly support payments, but that he needed
the funds on deposit to complete the construction of a
building in his electronics business (R. 14 & 15). This peti~
tion was never heard by the court as the record shows that
on February 11, 1958 a stipulation was filed whereby both
parties agreed to release the lien (R. 19). Although the
record is silent, counsel will admit that this stipulation of
release of lien, along with plaintiff's promise to pay a
$160.00 attorney's fee, was given in consideration of de-fendant's signing a consent for Samuel Clyde Kemp to
adopt his child. The consent for adoption was signed by
defendant on February 10, 1958 and was filed along with
the petition of adoption on that same day (R. 29).
Almost immediately following his giving of consent,
defendant realized the serious consequences of the thing
that he had done, and promptly petitioned to the court
to set aside the consent for adoption. Grasping at any
reason, defendant based his petition primarily on the
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ground that the payment of the $160.00 attorney's fee
and the removal of the lien were not done within 5 days
pursuant to their agreement (R. 18). Defendant was not
represented by counsel when this motion was made or
presented to the court (R. 20). Based upon the fact that
a bona fide dispute existed as to the time when payment
of the $160.00 was to take place and when the lien would
be released, Judge Stewart M. Hanson of the Third District
Court entered an order denying defendant's motion to
set aside the consent. It is from this order that defendant
appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMIT·
TING DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS CONSENT
FOR ADOPTION.
A. WHETHER A CONSENT FOR ADOPTION
CAN BE EFFECTIVEL1· WITHDRA \VN DE..
PENDS UPON ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE PARTICULAR C.ASE.
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE RE..
QUIRE A REVERSAL OF THE T R I A L
COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
THE RIGHT TO WITHDRA \V HIS CONSENT.
C. IN THE EVENT THE COURT DENIES DE..
FEND ANT THE RIGHT TO WITHDRA\\7 HIS
CONSENT FOR ADOPTION, THE M:\TTER
SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMIT-TING DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS CONSENT
FOR ADOPTION.
A. WHETHER A CONSENT FOR ADOPTION
CAN BE EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN DEPENDS
UPON ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTI-CULAR CASE.
The extent to which a natural parent has the right to
withdraw a previously given consent for adoption, is a
subject upon which authorities are not in agreement.
Many jurisdictions have taken the position that the
natural parent may effectively withdraw or revoke the
consent any time before the adoption has been finally
approved or decreed by the court. This rule is stated in
the 1957 Am. Jur. Supplement, (Adoption of Children,
§ 37.1) to be the rule in the great majority of jurisdictions
wherein the question has arisen. It likewise has been ap-plied in many recent cases. See e.g. In re Thompson's Adop~
tion, 283 P.2d 493 (Kansas 1955); In re Bilyeau' s Adop~
tion, 310 P.2d 305 (Ore. 1957); Wilde vs. Buchanan,
303 S.W.2d 518 (Texas 1957); Kozak vs. Lutheran Chil~
dren's Aid Society, 124 N.E.2d 168 (Ohio 1955); In re
Byrd, 75 So.2d 331 (La. 1954).
The other viewpoint, which text writers announce to
be the more modern trend (Annotation, 156 A.L.R. 1011;
Am. Jur., Adoption of Children,§ 37.1, 1957 Supp.), is
that a consent once given cannot arbitrarily be withdrawn
in all instances. These authorities hold that the question
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whether a natural parent may effectively revoke previously
given consent so as to bar the granting of an adoption
decree depends upon all the circumstances of the particular
case. It is this latter position which was recently declared
to be the law of the jurisdiction of Utah.
The leading case is In re Adoption of D ________ , 122 •
Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223, which involved the adoption of
a two year old girl. The facts of that case are as follows:
Prior to the adoption the child since its birth had lived
with her grandmother, rather than her mother. Because
the grandmother was in poor health and physically unable
to care for the child, it was arranged that she be placed
with adopting parents. The new parents took the child
into their home and provided for her needs which included
a great deal of specialized medical attention. Because of
a delay in locating the child's natural father to get his
consent, the adoption proceedings were not completed in
the usual one year period. Some 14 months after the pl2ce~
ment, the child's natural mother decided to change her
mind and revoke the consent. It was held that under cir~
cumstances where the adoptive parents have accepted the
child, kept it in their home for a considerable period of
time so that mutual affections have developed, gone to
trouble and expense in providing care and in making a
home for said child, and in all respects satisfied the re~
quirements of the law as to adoptive parents, the natural
parent would not be permitted to revoke a previously
giYen consent.
Prior to the 0 ________ case, the same question was before
this court in the case of Taylor vs. Waddoups, 121 Utah
279, 241 P.2d 157. In that case the court reversed the
decision of the trial court and allo\ved a natural mother
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to set aside an adoption decree. While the Taylor case
was decided primarily on the ground that the consent
was invalid because it had not been signed in court, Justice
Wade and Justice Henriod preferred to rest their con-currences on the ground that the consent hJ.d been. crfc~.>
tively revoked prior to the adoption. In the later D _______ _
case, supra, the court was careful not to disturb the reason-ing of the Taylor case declaring that cases of this type
must each depend on their part:cular facts. It v\.ras stated:
"Reading of many cases on this subject teaches
that each depends upon its own facts: The circum-stances of the placement of the child; those under
which the consent was given; the length of time
the adopting parents have had the child; any
'vested rights' that have intervened; the welfare
of the child; the conduct, as well as the character
and ability of the respective claimants; these and
the particular governing statute are all given con-sideration in determining whether the consent may
be revoked."
In reading the trial court's decision in the instant case
(R. 20), it is clear that all of the above factors were
not taken into consideration. Rather, the decision was made
to depend upon the results of a dispute as to when certain
acts relating to the payment of an attorney's fee had been
performed. It is defendant's contention on appeal that his
rights do not depend upon this technicality, because under
the particular facts as they here exist, defendant had a
right to withdraw his consent as a matter of law.

B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE RE-QUIRE A REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO
WITHDRAW HIS CONSENT.
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In approaching the problem at hand it is well to
keep in mind that the right of natural parents to the custo. .
dy of their children has always been regarded as one of
the highest of natural rights. See In re Gerald Fusco, 127
A.2d 468 (Del. 1956). This principle was acknowledged
by the Missouri Court (which incidentally follows the
Utah rule on the question of withdrawal of consent) in
the very recent case of Adoption of McKinze, 275 S.W.2d
365 which affirmed a ruling of a trial court dismissing a
petition for adoption where the natural mother had re. .
voked her consent. There the court stated:

"It must always be born in mind that the rights
of natural parents to the custody and possession
of their children are among the highest of natural
rights, and, being so, are not to be interferred with
by the state except where it clearly appears that the
natural parents have forfeited their rights by their
own misconduct and the child's best interests will
be served by allowing it to be adopted by some one
else. Consequently, it is uniformly held as a simple
matter of natural justice that adoption statutes are
to be construed in favor of the rights of natural
parents, and that when controversy arises between
natural parents and those who seek to destroy their
parental status, every reasonable intendment is
made in favor of the formers' claims."
The above general principle should serve as a guide
in analyzing the facts of the instant case. These facts,
show beyond question that:
( 1) This case does not involve the destruction of any
intervening "vested rights".
( 2) In this case defendant attempted to withdraw
consent almost immediately after it was given.
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( 3) The circumstances under which the consent was
given favor its withdrawal.
( 4) The best interests of the child would be served
by allowing the consent to be withdrawn.
These factors will be discussed separately in the order
mentioned above.
( 1) This case does not involve the destruction of any
intervening "vested rights".

In analyzing those cases which have deprived the
natural parent the right to withdraw a consent, it is par-ticularly noted that they invariably involve a situation
where the child has been placed in a new home for a sub-stantial period of time and the bonds of affection have
been forged between the new parents and the child. See
Annotation, 156 A.L.R. 1011; In re Adoption of D ________ ,
122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223; In re Adoption of Cannon,
53 N.W.2d 877. Under such circumstances, courts have
been reluctant to uproot the child from its environment,
or to destroy a new parental relationship which has arisen.
Such a factor, however, does not exist in the case be-fore the court. The child, Jane Ann Miller, has resided
with her mother and stepfather since the time of their
marriage. She will continue to live in such home no matter
how this appeal is decided, because her mother was award-ed custody at the time of her divorce from defendant.
Should appellant prevail in this appeal, there is no reason
why the child cannot continue to have a very happy and
satisfactory relationship with her stepfather. On the other
hand, to uphold the decision of the trial court is to for-ever deprive this father of his little girl whom he but
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naturally loves and cherishes, and who is entitled to this
love of a natural father. Such a consequence is way out
of proportion to the mistake defendant made of signing
a consent for adoption in a moment of thoughtlessness.
(2) In this case defendant attempted to withdraw con,
sent almost immediately after it was given.
The length of time elapsing between the giving of con,
sent and the attempted withdrawal is one of the factors
to consider in determining whether to allow withdrawal
of said consent. See Annotation, 156 A.L.R. 1011. It will
be noted here that the consent was given on February 10,
1958, and defendant's motion for withdrawal was dated
February 19, 1958. Thus only nine days elapsed between
these two events. From this, it can be assumed that de,
fendant realized his mistake and almost immediately took
steps to rectify the same. This is but another factor sup,
porting an effective withdrawal.

( 3) The circumstances under which the consent was
gi'ven favor its withdrawal.
The record in this case in no way indicates that the
defendant signed the consent because of any lack of love
for his daughter. Nor does it in any way imply that he
is unwilling or unable to measure up to parental responsi.bilities. On the contrary, it can be shown from various
portions of the record (R. 18, 19, 20, 22, 24) that the
consent was actually bargained for at a time when de,
fendant felt a pressing need for financial resources. The
inducement for such consent was plaintiff's releasing the
lien on defendant's funds which had been placed there
under the terms of a burdensome and unequitable divorce
decree, plus payment of a $160.00 attorney's fee.
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Had defendant been represented by counsel in the
lower court and correctly advised as to his rights (See
argument under Point III of this brief) he alleges that
circumstances could have been brought out which would
render invalid the entire agreement. However, even as
skimpy as the facts appear in the record, it is apparent
that the agreement reeked with illegality, and was con~
trary to public policy. It approaches the crime of child
selling, which is so repugnant to the people of this state
that it has been made a felony by the legislature (See
76~ 15~3 U.C.A. 1953). Obviously such an agreement can
not be the basis for a valid consent for adoption, and the
whole agreement should be declared void (as to the
effect of illegality see McCormick ·vs. Life Insurance Co.
of America, 6 Utah 2d 170, 308 P.2d 949).
Defendant does not deny his part in the agreement.
However, the child's mother and stepfather participated
to an equal, if not greater extent. Defendant atvempted to
immediately repent after coming to a realization of what
transpired; yet they insist on holding him to this illegal
agreement. It would be unequitable and unfair to both
the natural father and the child to allow them to do so.
( 4) The best interests of the child would be served
by allowing the consent to be withdrawn.
There is nothing in the record to show how this adop~
tion could possibly be for the best interests of the child.
Under such circumstances, there is no choice but to apply
the well recognized presumption that the welfare of the
child will best be subserved by being in the custody of
its natural parents. In re Adoption of D ________ , 122 Utah
525, 252 P.2d 223; Walton vs. Coffman, 110 Utah 1,
169 P.2d 97.
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Plaintiff has alleged that defendant earns a very ade..
quate monthly salary (R. 10), which defendant readily
admits. He is perfectly competent and capable of supporting
his child and desires to do so.
Concerning defendant's love for his child, the record
shows two separate occasions when he petitioned the
court to protect his rights of visitation (R. 7 & 14). Also
the trouble and expense of bringing this appeal is another
indication of his sincerity.
Certainly the child's welfare cannot be enhanced by
depriving her of this love, support, and attention to which
she is entitled under the law.
C. IN THE EVENT THE COURT DENIES DE..
FEND ANT THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW HIS CON-SENT FOR ADOPTION, THE MATTER SHOULD BE
REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR FUR-THER PROCEEDINGS.
Rule 76 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
as follows:
"The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm, or
modify any order or judgment appealed from . . .
or may direct a new trial in any case, or further
proceedings to be had.
Under such a rule, it is generally conceded that when
the record is in such shape that the appellate court can-not in justice determine what final judgment should be
rendered, the case will be remanded for such further pro.ceedings as the interests of justice may require. See Am.
Jur., Appeal & Error, § § 1210, 1211.
If there is any one thing in this appeal that stands
out above all others, it is the manner in which the case
was mishandled in the trial court. When defendant pre-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sented his motion to set aside the consent for adoption,
there were many relevant factors which should have been
presented to the court. Among these were the circum. .
stances surrounding his giving of consent; his reasons for
so doing; the cohersions that were brought to bear upon
him; his conduct toward the child prior to the adoption;
his feelings toward the child; his religious beliefs concern-ing the child; his ability to provide and the advantages he
could afford the child; the manner in which he was mis-informed as to his legal rights at the time of the consent;
and other material evidence.
Indeed, since defendant was acting without counsel,
the trial court was not briefed as to the law, and the
matter was presented, argued, and decided primarily on
a technical point which actually should have had little
or no relevance to the decision.
In light of the extreme importance of the question
involved, and the high nature of the parental right, the
interests of justice would at the very least require that
defendant be afforded the opportunity of having a full
and adequate hearing of his case.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the facts as they appear
in this case require a reversal of the trial court's order
denying defendant the right to withdraw his consent for
adoption. However, in the event defendant is not granted
the relief he seeks, the matter should be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID E. WEST
Attorney

/or ApjJellant
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